From the Stocks, to Handcuffs, to Hollywood: An Analysis of Public Humiliation in Judge Judy’s Syndi-court by McKown, Martin
Hamline University's School of Law's Journal of Public Law and
Policy
Volume 36 | Issue 2 Article 3
2015
From the Stocks, to Handcuffs, to Hollywood: An
Analysis of Public Humiliation in Judge Judy’s
Syndi-court
Martin McKown
Duquesne University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp
Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Hamline. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hamline University's
School of Law's Journal of Public Law and Policy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Hamline. For more information, please contact
jneilson01@hamline.edu.
Recommended Citation
McKown, Martin (2015) "From the Stocks, to Handcuffs, to Hollywood: An Analysis of Public Humiliation in Judge Judy’s Syndi-
court," Hamline University's School of Law's Journal of Public Law and Policy: Vol. 36: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/jplp/vol36/iss2/3
FROM THE STOCKS, TO HANDCUFFS, TO HOLLYWOOD: AN ANALYSIS 
OF PUBLIC HUMILIATION IN JUDGE JUDY’S SYNDI-COURT 
 
Martin McKown* 
 
A plaintiff stands as the bailiff swears him in. The judge takes 
one look at the plaintiff, who is wearing a pair of casual jeans, and 
asks, “Who taught you to dress like that for court?”1 The plaintiff 
swallows a lump in his throat as humiliating silence ensues. But the 
silence does not last long. Enraged by the plaintiff’s lackadaisical 
appearance, the judge proceeds to chastise the plaintiff for his 
obvious indiscretion. After minutes of aggressive censuring, the man 
attempts to offer an excuse by interrupting the judge. The judge’s 
reply is sharp: “I’M SPEAKING!” The plaintiff stops mid-syllable. 
The judge declares, “This isn’t American Idol sir, this is a court!”2 
The mass laughter that follows reminds the plaintiff that he being 
recorded in front of a live studio audience, and that the proceeding 
will be broadcast to millions of at-home viewers. The plaintiff feels 
embarrassment churn in the pit of his stomach. In this moment, the 
plaintiff is questioning his decision to appear on syndi-court. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The term “syndi-court” refers to televised court shows such 
as Judge Judy, The People’s Court, and Judge Joe Brown.3 The 
phrase was coined because the television rights to these shows are 
                                                 
* McKown is a third-year day student at Duquesne University School of Law, 
member of the Duquesne Law Review, and former congressional staffer. He would 
like to thank Professor Susan C. Hascall for providing inspiration and guidance 
throughout the writing process. 
1 This hypothetical scenario was created by the author for illustrative purposes. 
The quotes included in the scenario are similar to those of actual syndi-court 
judges. 
2 American Idol, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=American_Idol&oldid=632705456 (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2014). American Idol is an American singing competition television 
series that employs a panel of judges who critique the contestants’ performances. 
3 See Philip Z. Kimball, Syndi-Court Justice: Judge Judy and Exploitation of 
Arbitration, 4 J. AM. ARB. 145, 145-47 (2005), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/essay/syndicourtj
ustice.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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bought on the syndication market.4 Syndi-courts feature actual 
litigants seeking to resolve legitimate disputes.5 While syndi-courts 
portray themselves as courts created by the state, they are actually 
arbitration proceedings.6 These arbitration-based reality shows 
recently gained popularity across the country due to the personalities 
of their judges.7 For example, Judge Judith Sheindlin, the presiding 
judge on Judge Judy, is famous for her quick wit and humor on the 
bench, which is similar to that offered by the judge in the hypothetical 
scenario above.8 Often, her witty and humorous remarks, known as 
“judyisms,” humiliate or embarrass the individuals to which they are 
directed.9 
While orations by Judge Judy may embarrass or humiliate 
litigants, her comments also offer true life lessons and advice (e.g., 
parties should dress appropriately to court).10 But is this harsh advice 
directed precisely to those individuals or, rather, society-at-large?11 
This article explores the origin, use, and effect of public humiliation 
in Judge Judy’s syndi-court.12 First, this article explores the role of 
public humiliation in America’s legal system since the colonial era 
                                                 
4 Id. “Syndication is the practice of selling rights to present television programs, 
generally to local television stations or cable channels. Most shows on television 
are from the syndication market. The exceptions to this are generally current 
network prime-time programs, live news programs and live coverage of sports and 
other special events.” Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Kimball, supra note 3. 
8 Id. She is generally known by the name “Judge Judy.” Id. 
9 Judge Judy, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Judge_Judy&oldid=632565536 (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2014). For example, Judge Judy frequently makes statements like: 
“If you live to be 100, you will never be as smart as I am, sir,” “Clearly you are not 
wrapped too tight,” “Where did you think you were coming to today, a tea party,” 
and “Do I look like I need help from you?” Id. 
10 Id. Examples of these statements include: “A good deed never goes 
unpunished,” “Beauty fades, dumb is forever,” “If it doesn’t make sense, it’s not 
true,” and “Do you know when teenagers are lying? When their mouths move.” Id. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Parts II-III. 
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and identifies key issues surround “shaming sanctions.”13 Next, this 
article links the traditions and customs of public humiliation in 
America to pluralistic adjudication in Judge Judy’s syndi-court.14 
Further, this article suggests that Judge Judy employs public 
humiliation to address the moral collapse of our society, rather than 
the distinct indiscretions of individual litigants.15 Finally, this article 
concludes that American legal scholars should embrace syndi-courts 
for serving as visible public platforms that promote personal 
accountability.16 
 
II.BACKGROUND 
 
A.Public Humiliation in Colonial America 
The American legal system has long incorporated public 
humiliation as normative punishment in criminal contexts.17 
Applying British law, seventeenth century colonial magistrates used 
shaming sanctions in many ways.18 These magistrates often ordered 
criminal offenders to confess their guilt and express their remorse in 
                                                 
13 See infra Part II. This article uses the terms “public humiliation” and “shaming 
sanctions” interchangeably. Shaming sanctions are usually criminal penalties that 
incorporate methods of conventional public humiliation. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 Id. 
16 See infra Part IV. Many scholars criticize syndi-court shows and judges for 
arguably distorting the American public’s perception of the justice system. See, 
e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, Blame Judge Judy: The Effects of Syndicated Television 
Courtrooms on Jurors, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 557, 557-58 (2002). However, 
there is little literature with respect to the positive implications of syndi-court 
shows. 
17 James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1089 (1998). 
18 Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1777 to 
1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 842 (1999). As a customary form of punishment, 
shaming sanctions in colonial America were firmly rooted in British penal 
ideology. Id. Indeed, colonial magistrates commonly applied British penal statutes 
verbatim. Id. During the eighteenth century, Britain’s penal code defined at least 
160 capital offenses within colonial America. Id. 
4 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY V.36.2 
the town square.19 Other offenders were forced to sit in the stocks as 
bystanders sneered and snickered.20 Sometimes, offenders confined 
to the stocks were also forced to wear dough, cabbage, or other items 
on their heads.21 To heighten the mortification, onlookers would 
throw stale eggs at the offenders.22 More severe forms of punishment 
involved branding and maiming.23 All of these punishments were 
widely viewed by the public because, to maximize the humiliation, 
local officials implemented the penalties in bustling areas.24 
Into the eighteenth century and following the American 
Revolutionary War, public humiliation continued being enshrined 
into American culture.25 Although British penal ideology fell out of 
favor following American independence, religious clerics publicly 
lectured criminals in an effort to reform their character by prompting 
remorse.26 In some cases, the offender had to beg their congregation 
for forgiveness following formal admonition from church officials.27 
These practices influenced penal philosophy in early America 
because many communities were founded upon common religious 
                                                 
19 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880, 1888 (1991). 
20 James A. Cox, Bilboes, Brands, and Branks: Colonial Crimes and Punishments, 
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUND., 
http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/spring03/branks.cfm (last visited Sept. 
29, 2014). 
21 Massaro, supra note 19, at 1914. 
22 Id. 
23 Jon A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern 
Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1361 (1989). 
24 Rosalind K. Kelley, Sentenced to Wear the Scarlet Letter: Judicial Innovations 
in Sentencing—Are They Constitutional?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 759, 772 (1989). 
25 Meskell, supra note 18, at 843 (noting Americans’ “aversion to the harshness 
of the English criminal code” following the American Revolutionary War); 
Barbara Clare Morton, Bringing Skeletons out of the Closet and into the Light—
”Scarlet Letter” Sentencing Can Meet the Goals of Probation in Modern America 
Because It Deprives Offenders of Privacy, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 116 (2001) 
(discussing “modern implementation of shame sanctions”). 
26 Morton, supra note 25, at 102. 
27 See Scott E. Sanders, Scarlet Letters, Bilboes and Cable TV: Are Shame 
Punishments Cruel and Outdated or Are They A Viable Option for American 
Jurisprudence?, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 359, 363 (1998). 
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beliefs.28 The religious homogeny and social intimacy of early-
American communities rendered shaming sanctions particularly 
effective because most offenders feared the disgrace of public 
admonishment.29 Thus, most communities punished offenders with 
shaming sanctions, rather than simple imprisonment.30 
However, during the nineteenth century, judges increasingly 
punished offenders with imprisonment because the small intimate 
communities that previously existed in colonial America had evolved 
into anonymous modern populates.31 By diluting the fear associated 
with public humiliation, the newfound anonymity in urban America 
caused the effect of shaming sanctions to fade.32 As crime rates began 
to rise, judges preferred long term prison sentences over other forms 
of punishment like shaming.33 
 
B.Public Humiliation in America Today 
Into the twentieth century, the newfound right to privacy—
now a fading social norm—enticed contemporary jurists to 
reevaluate the legality of public humiliation as punishment for 
criminal offenses.34 Despite the elaboration of the right to privacy, 
courts consistently sustain shaming sanctions in light of 
constitutional principles.35 For example, in Florida, an appellate 
court stated “[t]he mere requirement that a defendant display a 
‘scarlet letter’ as part of his punishment is not necessarily offensive 
                                                 
28 Major W. Renn Gade, Crime and Punishment in American History, 146 MIL. 
L. REV. 297, 298 (1994). 
29 Massaro, supra note 19, at 1912. Influenced by Judeo-Christian principles, 
communities expected offenders to both seek forgiveness and repent. Id. at 1912-
13. 
30 Gade, supra note 28, at 298. 
31 Morton, supra note 25, at 105. 
32 Id. at 106. 
33 Id. at 107. 
34 Id. at 116-17. The twentieth century marked the recognition and expansion of 
the constitutional right to privacy. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1992). 
35 See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
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to the Constitution.”36 In fact, courts acknowledge that the scope of 
discretion given to sentencing judges is breathtakingly broad.37 
Furthermore, the American legal community has not voiced 
any significant objection to shaming sanctions.38 Many legal scholars 
agree that shaming sanctions are a constitutional and effective 
alternative to imprisonment.39 The United States Supreme Court also 
agrees.40 In Paul v. Davis, the police circulated a flyer including the 
names and photographs of shoplifters.41 There, the Supreme Court 
imposed a barrier to constitutional challenges of shaming sanctions.42 
Writing for the majority, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist 
stated “that the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither 
‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without 
due process of law.”43 
After Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(“the Act”), shaming sanctions became a tool for supervised 
release.44 Through the Act, Congress directed the newly-created 
United States Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines for 
courts sentencing federal offenders.45 Congress passed the Act to 
increase consistency among sentencing policies for the federal 
                                                 
36 Id. at 125. 
37 See, e.g., Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971). But see State v. 
Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Tenn. 1996) (noting that courts may not “impose 
punishments which are beyond the bounds of traditional notions of rehabilitation”). 
38 Whitman, supra note 17, at 1057. Still, some legal scholars examine the 
constitutionality of shaming sanctions with skepticism. See, e.g., Massaro, supra 
note 19, at 1944 (noting “[o]ne of the principal constitutional objections is based 
on the eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment”). 
39 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 594 (1996) (“Shaming penalties unambiguously express condemnation 
and are a feasible alternative to imprisonment for many offenses”). 
40 See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
41 Id. at 694-97. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 712. 
44 See generally Preston H. Neel, Punishment or Not: The Effect of United States 
v. Gementera’s Shame Condition on the Ever-Changing Concept of Supervised 
Release Conditions, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 153, 153-54 (2007). 
45 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. (2012). 
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criminal justice system.46 The Act also created a supervised release 
system to help imprisoned offenders reintegrate into their 
communities through rehabilitative means.47 Accordingly, some 
sentencing judges impose shaming sanctions as part of supervised 
release conditions to promote social reintegration of offenders.48 
However, subsequent changes to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines call into question the legality of shaming sanctions for 
purposes of supervised release.49 According to a congressional report 
concerning those amendments, Congress created the supervise 
release system “to ease the defendant’s transition into the community 
after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious 
offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a 
fairly short period in prison for punishment.”50 Thus, while 
supervised release conditions should help rehabilitate or reintegrate 
an offender, supervised release conditions might not be a means of 
reprimand or retribution.51 Although the Supreme Court has upheld 
shaming sanctions in other contexts, the court has never addressed 
the lawfulness of shaming sanctions for purposes of supervised 
release under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.52 
C.A Survey of Modern Case Law: Public Humiliation in 
Official Courts 
Despite a lack of precedential guidance from the Supreme 
Court, a handful of intermediate appellate courts disfavor shaming 
                                                 
46 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012). 
47 S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1983). 
48 See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming 
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2192-93 (2003). 
49 S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984). 
50 Id. Notably, the section of the law authorizing judges to impose supervised 
released conditions is entirely devoid of the term “punishment.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a). The chief purpose of the law is rehabilitation. Id. 
51 S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984). 
52 Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) with Gementera v. United States, 
546 U.S. 1031 (2005) (denying certiorari where a convicted mail thief challenged 
a supervised release condition requiring the thief to wear a signboard stating, “I 
stole mail. This is my punishment”). 
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sanctions as conditions of supervised release.53 In Illinois, for 
instance, an appellate court vacated a punishment in People v. 
Johnson that required an offender to, as a condition of supervised 
release, publish an apology containing her mug shot in a local 
newspaper.54 The Johnson court recognized “the trial judge may be 
attempting to put more bite, or punishment, in the supervision 
process.”55 However, in considering the potential emotional and 
mental consequences of the publication requirement, the Johnson 
court determined that any psychological damage likely caused by the 
publication was inconsistent with rehabilitative goals.56 Thus, the 
court invalidated the publication requirement.57 
In a similar case, People v. Hackler, the California Court of 
Appeals vacated a supervised release condition requiring a defendant 
to wear a shirt broadcasting his status as a felony thief.58 Referencing 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter, the trial court in that case 
branded the offender as a modern day “Hester Prin [sic],” and 
characterized the sanction as “going back to some extent to the era of 
stocks.”59 Ultimately, the appellate court reasoned that shaming 
sanctions expose offenders to public ridicule and humiliation, rather 
than facilitate rehabilitation.60 Accordingly, the Hackler court struck 
down the shaming sanction in that case.61 
Two years after the Hackler decision, the New York Court of 
Appeals agreed in People v. Letterlough that shaming sanctions do 
not reasonably relate to rehabilitation.62 In that case, the court 
evaluated a condition requiring a drunk driver to place a florescent 
                                                 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004); People v. 
Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995); People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 
(Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1993); People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988). 
54 People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1993). 
59 Id. at 686. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 682. 
62 People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. 1995). 
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sign on his vehicle stating “CONVICTED DWI.”63 The Letterlough court 
reasoned that “public disclosure of a person’s crime, and the 
attendant humiliation and public disgrace, has historically been 
regarded strictly as a form of punishment.”64 Hence, the Letterlough 
court ruled the sanction was unrelated to rehabilitation and, therefore, 
impermissible as a supervised release condition.65 
More recently, however, in United States v. Gementera, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a 
supervised release condition requiring a mail thief to stand in front 
of a local post office wearing a sign stating he stole mail.66 The 
Gementera court agreed with the trial court’s “reasoning that 
rehabilitation would better be served by means other than extended 
incarceration and punishment is plainly reasonable.”67 The court also 
explained that the offender failed to prove the condition violated 
contemporary standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.68 At bottom, the Gementera court 
upheld the supervised release condition because, unlike the Hackler 
and Letterlough courts, the Gementera court found the condition to 
be reasonably related to the objective of rehabilitation.69 In a glaring 
dissent, however, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins argued “[t]o affirm 
the imposition of such punishments recalls a time in our history when 
pillories and stocks were the order of the day.”70 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Distinguishing the Purposes and Effects of Public 
Humiliation 
                                                 
63 Id. at 147. 
64 Id. at 149. 
65 Id. at 150. 
66 United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004). 
67 Id. at 607. 
68 Id. at. 608. 
69 Id. at 607. 
70 Id. at 612 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Despite this debate, sentencing judges 
regularly impose shaming sanctions in the context of first-offender petty crimes. 
Neel, supra note 44, at 173. 
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The purposes of public humiliation in official courts are 
twofold.71 First, shaming sanctions offer offenders opportunities to 
rehabilitate themselves without institutional confinement, which is 
often costly and reserved for society’s most serious offenders.72 
Second, shaming sanctions are often punitive.73 Despite this 
theoretical distinction, courts struggle to draw lines between 
rehabilitative and punitive shaming sanctions.74 The Letterlough 
court observed the “inherent overlap and the difficulty in drawing 
lines between rehabilitative and punitive or deterrent sanctions.”75 
Courts also struggle to assess the psychological effect of 
shaming sanctions on individuals.76 The Johnson court 
acknowledged that “[h]olding an offender up to ridicule has an 
impact upon the offender that does not have the disadvantages of 
                                                 
71 Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 149. Note that official courts are non-arbitration 
courts created by state or federal law, such as federal district courts. 
72 Id. As the Letterlough court explained, “[t]he utility of rehabilitation as a 
vehicle for preventing criminal behavior ‘rests upon the belief that human behavior 
is the product of antecedent causes, that these causes can be identified, and that on 
this basis therapeutic measures can be employed to effect changes in the behavior 
of the person treated.’” Id. at 148 (quoting LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law § 1.5, at 33). 
73 Id. at 149. Generally, “‘[w]hen one shames another person, the goal is to 
degrade the object of shame, to place him lower in the chain of being, to 
dehumanize him.’” Gementera, 379 F.3d at 612 (quoting Dan Markel, Are 
Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications 
for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2179 (2001)). 
74 See Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d at 153 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). In the opinion of 
one judge, “[t]he sentencing environment does not abide a theoretical purity that 
would cabin ‘punishment’ and ‘rehabilitation’ into such discrete, mutually 
exclusive universes.” Id. 
75 Id. at 149. Peripheral purposes also exist, such as to protect the public through 
warning. Id. at 147. In Letterlough, when the trial court required a drunk driver to 
bear the sign “CONVICTED DWI” on his license plate, the judge said, “This 
gentleman is 54 years of age and I do not wish to be the one that opens a newspaper 
and sees that this gentleman has caused an accident that has taken an innocent 
person’s life because I did not do something that either warns the public or treated 
his problem. I hope to be doing both.” Id. 
76 See People v. Johnson, 528 N.E.2d 1360, 1362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
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imprisonment nor the financial detriment to the offender or the 
offender’s family of a substantial fine,” and that, in certain cases, 
shaming sanctions “might be quite rehabilitative and instructive, 
particularly to people who do not have general criminal tendencies 
and who would be embarrassed by the publicity.”77 Nonetheless, the 
Johnson majority also acknowledged that, without professional 
assistance, courts cannot definitively predict the psychological or 
psychiatric effect of shaming sanctions.78 
In reviewing shaming sanctions, courts and legal scholars 
likewise consider the psychological effects of these sanctions on the 
public.79 Indeed, even the Gementera court alluded to the overall 
effects of shaming sanctions on society-at-large.80 In the context of 
syndi-courts, these composite controversies raise an important 
question: what effects does public humiliation in Judge Judy’s syndi-
court have on individual litigants and society-at-large?81 
 
B. Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, Syndi-courts Are 
Legitimate Rule Setters and Decision Makers 
 
Before proceeding with further analysis, it is important to 
delineate the inherent legitimacy of syndi-courts. Without a 
formalistic notion of legitimacy intrinsic to official courts established 
by the state, syndi-courts do not have teeth; syndi-court rulings 
would be neither binding nor final. Syndi-courts maintain their 
legitimacy through the theory of legal pluralism. 
Legal pluralism “is generally defined as a situation in which 
two or more legal systems coexist in the same social field.”82 In 
essence, legal pluralism extends the rule of law beyond official forms 
of law to include unofficial notions of law, such as custom and 
                                                 
77 Id. at 1363 (Green, J., concurring). 
78 Id. at 1362. 
79 See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 605 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Kahan, supra note 39). 
80 Id. 
81 See infra Parts IIIC-D. 
82 Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988). 
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tradition.83 Since the conception of this theory, legal scholars mostly 
apply legal pluralism to the study of post-colonial societies in 
Africa.84 In the early twentieth century, social scientists examined the 
legal order of indigenous peoples among these colonized societies.85 
While those indigenous peoples were subject to European law 
practiced by colonists, the indigenous peoples subtly maintained a 
rich variety of customary law in nondominant legal regimes.86 
The parallel arrangement between these dominant and 
nondominant systems occasionally offered individuals an 
opportunity for forum shopping.87 For example, in a family support 
dispute, a party seeking to avoid paying alimony might have 
preferred to litigate in an official court because English common law 
did not obligate individuals to offer family support.88 The other party, 
however, might have sought to resolve the dispute in a customary 
legal regime because, as a matter of custom, family support was 
prerequisite to custody and marital rights.89 Therefore, despite the 
existence of dominant, official court systems in post-colonial Africa, 
some parties sought to resolve their disputes in nondominant, 
unofficial systems.90 
Syndi-courts create similar opportunities for forum shopping 
because many litigants prefer to appear in syndi-court in lieu of 
pursuing formal litigation.91 Particularly, syndi-court forums offer 
stark advantages to defendants: 
A defendant who thinks he or she has a bad case has a great 
incentive to appear on the show, since the appearance itself absolves 
                                                 
83 Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Using Systems Theory to Study Legal 
Pluralism: What Could Be Gained?, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 265, 265 (2012). 
84 Merry, supra note 82, at 869. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See generally Savitri Goonesekere, Family Support and Maintenance: 
Emerging Issues in Some Developing Countries with Mixed Jurisdictions, 44 FAM. 
CT. REV. 361 (2006) (exploring the existence of plural legal traditions that enable 
manipulation of jurisdiction for personal advantage). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 362. 
90 Id. 
91 See Kimball, supra note 3. 
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any personal liability. Alternatively, if the defendant has a very good 
defense, they can earn an appearance fee for a few minutes of on air 
berating by someone like Judge Judy.92 
But, for both plaintiffs and defendants, syndi-court is cheaper 
than formal litigation because the expenses of the parties are 
generally paid for by the producers of each show.93 Additionally, 
judgments against syndi-court litigants are not reported as small 
claims judgments to credit bureaus.94 Finally, syndi-court offers 
litigants the flexibility of arbitration, which is typically faster than 
traditional litigation because syndi-courts need not adhere to 
complex rules of procedure or evidence, and need not obey rigid 
calendars enforced by formal courts.95 Thus, litigants may seek to 
resolve their disputes in the unofficial syndi-court system, instead of 
the official state-created court system.96 
However, unlike the dominant legal system of many post-
colonial African countries, which were established after their 
corollary customary legal regimes, the official court system in the 
United States predates the syndi-court system. Ironically, this 
chronologically inverse pluralistic relationship gives syndi-courts 
their binding authority. Without an official system that recognizes 
arbitration law, the judgments in arbitration-based reality court 
shows would be frail. After all, while the methods used by syndi-
court judges are rooted in age-old tradition or custom, the creation of 
syndi-court as a vehicle for dispute resolution is not.97 
The relationship between official courts in the United States 
and syndi-courts is more analogous to that of state-recognized 
customary courts and other official courts in African countries 
today.98 Malawi, for example, enacted ordinances identifying courts 
                                                 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See supra Part II. 
98 See generally Megan Crouch, Improving Legal Access for Rural Malawi 
Villagers, JURIST, (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM), 
http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/08/megan-crouch-local-courts-malawi.php. After 
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having authority to hear disputes under customary or traditional law, 
which would not have been enforced otherwise.99 Overall, within a 
framework of governance, dominant, official court systems that 
incorporate nondominant, unofficial court systems strengthen the 
authority base of those otherwise unofficial legal regimes, whether 
they be customary regimes or syndi-courts. 
 
C. Public Humiliation by Judge Judy Has Little Effect on 
Individual Litigants 
The effects of Judge Judy’s tough adjudicating approach 
illustrates the dichotomy of modern privacy values and colonial-style 
public humiliation.100 In colonial America, shaming sanctions 
effectively deterred wrongdoing by exploiting a shared sense of 
disgust against criminal offenders in tightknit communities.101 In 
modern America, shaming sanctions should be equally effective 
because they deprive offenders of privacy.102 However, many Judge 
Judy litigants, plaintiffs and defendants alike, “are just looking for 
their fifteen minutes of fame.”103 Thus, Judge Judy’s hard-hitting 
style does not affect individual litigants in the same way that shaming 
sanctions influence criminal offenders.104 
Nevertheless, Judge Judy’s practices undoubtedly emanate 
from colonial customs and traditions.105 Through rhetoric, Judge 
Judy commonly berates litigants for inappropriate behavior or sloppy 
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conduct.106 As her cases unfold, Judge Judy often makes statements 
such as: “[Y]ou ought to be ashamed of yourself!” or “Do you feel 
as if you’re getting whipped? You sure are!”107 These statements, in 
particular, spring from colonial activities and ideas, such as when 
wrongful parties were sentenced to public whippings.108 Judge 
Judy’s verbal statements also connote her principal understanding of 
the effects of humiliating experiences on litigants.109 
Alone, Judge Judy’s hard-hitting words are not intended to 
cause all the embarrassment for the parties.110 Her remarks sting so 
much because they are made in front of a live audience and millions 
of at-home viewers.111 The audience often laughs at litigants forced 
to describe or explain lucrative acts.112 Further, the audience 
regularly applauds Judge Judy for delivering demeaning remarks that 
indirectly label hostile litigants as enemies.113 As one commentator 
noted, “implied cues, combined with Judge Judy’s affectively 
charged delivery, allow the audience to rehearse public moral 
posturing along with her.”114 Like colonial era jurists, Judge Judy 
knows all too well the desired effect of embarrassment on 
antagonistic parties in front of an audience.115 Actually, in chastising 
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one individual, she stated: “Consider yourself having been 
reasonably humiliated in front of ten million people. Now, without 
saying another word, turn around, and find the exit. Goodbye.”116 
But because Judge Judy’s “no nonsense” temperament is so 
widely known, most litigants that appear on the show have some 
forewarning of the possible embarrassment to which she may subject 
them to.117 Accordingly, some individuals who appear on the show 
are desperately seeking attention, or hope that their brief television 
appearance will miraculously propel them into fame and fortune.118 
Others appear on the show for material incentives.119 For example, 
litigants receive an appearance fee of at least $100 and, in essence, 
an all-expense-paid vacation to Hollywood, California, where the 
show is filmed.120 Whatever their motives may be, the benefits for 
litigants who attend the show outweigh the verbal lashings that Judge 
Judy may deliver.121 Litigants who appear on Judge Judy contravene 
the basic tenets of colonial era probationers, who considered the loss 
of privacy a large price to pay.122 
Overall, in a society that values privacy, individuals generally 
comport to avoid widespread public embarrassment.123 Yet, Judge 
Judy litigants voluntarily subject themselves to verbal reprimands in 
front of millions of viewers.124 Prior to filming the show, the litigants 
know what to expect—a few flippant words from a television 
personality dressed in a black robe.125 With this anticipation, Judge 
Judy’s exacting words lose their “bite.”126 For that reason, the 
embarrassment experienced by litigants appearing before Judge Judy 
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does not parallel the discomfiture traditionally experienced by 
colonial era offenders.127 
D.  Judge Judy Uses Public Humiliation in Syndi-court to 
Address Big Picture Societal Transgressions 
While the embarrassment caused by Judge Judy may not have 
long term effects on individual litigants, this ostensible mortification 
does have an emotional impact on society-at-large.128 Perceivably, 
modern society has experienced a collapsing of traditional values and 
moral substance since the early twentieth century.129 Judge Judy’s 
actions, rulings, and words in her show are pointed to address this 
moral decay.130 The genesis of her goal harkens back to her 
experience as a family court judge.131 Through each case, Judge Judy 
uses her televised forum to address the moral carelessness of society-
at-large, just as colonial era magistrates did when they used the town 
square to punish morally decrepit offenders in early America.132 
The idea that America is experiencing as moral decline is 
shared among many factions.133 According to a recent poll, 53% of 
Democrats, 82% of Republicans, and 72% of independents have 
negative opinions of the country’s moral principles.134 Merely four 
decades ago, only one third of Americans felt that the nation’s morals 
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were poor.135 The decline of morality in America can be attributed to 
a number of reasons: alcohol and drugs; divorce; government 
dependency; greed; lack of religion; selfishness; and the internet, 
television, and other media; among other things.136 Regardless of 
whether (or why) moral decay is actually occurring in America, 
many people perceive this as being the case.137 
In her show, Judge Judy directly addresses the crumbling of 
morality in America.138 Judge Judy’s mission to cure America’s 
moral decay dates back to her tenure as a family court judge.139 In 
1982, New York City Mayor Ed Koch appointed her to Manhattan’s 
family court.140 On the bench, she heard over 20,000 cases involving 
juvenile adoption, child neglect and abuse, child support, custody, 
delinquents, domestic violence, guardianship, paternity, termination 
of paternal rights, and visitation.141 From this experience, Judge Judy 
believes that America’s moral decay derives from lack of honesty 
and responsibility and, notably, “the myopia of a media that, despite 
its vast power to do good, is too often asleep at the switch.”142 
Taking things into her own hands, Judge Judy’s rulings, 
actions, and words on her daytime television show illustrate an 
overarching theme of personal responsibility.143 Judge Judy 
highlights the basis of this theme in her memoir: “By shifting the 
emphasis from individual responsibility to government 
responsibility,” she says, “we have infantilized an entire 
population.”144 Thus, pandering to the broader television and cultural 
audience, Judge Judy addresses her concerns by broadcasting moral 
judgments rather than merely punishing irresponsible litigants.145 To 
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that end, like colonial officials who used shaming sanctions to 
heighten the social disapproval of criminal offenses in a highly 
socialized colonial America, Judge Judy uses her daytime television 
show as a bullhorn to speak directly to an equally socialized modern 
American about the moral discrepancies of its citizens.146 
 
IV.CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, syndi-court programs such as Judge Judy 
have become increasingly popular.147 This article makes three key 
observations with respect to syndi-courts.148 First, in general, a 
pluralistic perspective offers syndi-courts notions of formalistic 
legitimacy inherent to official courts, even though syndi-courts are 
private, unofficial means of adjudicating disputes.149 Second, syndi-
court judges like Judge Judy use public humiliation when dealing 
with foolish parties; however, unlike in the colonial era, when 
magistrates would publicly humiliate criminal offenders, public 
humiliation in syndi-courts does not trigger heightened feelings of 
shame today.150 Finally, although public humiliation in syndi-courts 
does not significantly impact individual litigants, syndi-court judges 
may use public humiliation to address societal immorality by 
pandering to a larger audience via television.151 Overall, the 
American legal community should embrace syndi-courts for offering 
society a public platform for accountability, honesty, and personal 
responsibility. 
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